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UNITED STATES v BYRUM-THE· MANAGEMENT POWER
QUESTION IN ESTATE TAXATION
The Supreme Court recently approved a techmque wluch permits
the holder of a majority mterest m a close corporatIon to reduce lus
estate tax burden sIgmficantly wIthout relinqUlslung lifetIme control
over the busmess. 1 In Untted States 'V. Byrum;}, the Supreme Court
affirmed the prmcIple that a settlor may retam broad management powers
over property transferred to an Irrevocable trust wIthout suffermg the
adverse effect of havmg that property mcluded m lus gross estate.s Section 2036 4 of the Internal Revenue Code5 provIdes that the gross estate
will mclude property transferred by the decedent If he has retained
certam proscribed rIghts m the property conveyed during hIS lifetIme. 6
It is frequently the objectIve of the taxpayer to retam maXImum
powers over the property transferred wIthout encounterIng the costly
consequences of sectIon 2036 and Its compamons, sectIon 2037 and section 2038. 7 Tlus objectIve IS partIcularly lffiportant where the stock
1. 92 S. Ct. 2382 (1972).
2.Id.
3. "Management powers" or "powers of adrrurustratlon" Include, among others, the
powers to sell and Invest, to exchange trust property, to vote trust Investlnents, and
to allocate receIpts between corpus and Income. ThIS Comment IS pnmarily concerned
wIth the power to vote the stock In trust. For a disCUSSIon of thIs subject see Gray &
Covey, State Street-A Case Study of Sectfons 2036(a) (2) and 2038, 15 TAX L. REv. 75
(1959) (hereInafter cIted as Gray & Covey]; Pednck, Grantor Powers and Estate TaxatIon: The Ties That Bind, 54 Nw U.L. REv. 527, 552 (1959) (hereInafter cIted as.
Pednck].
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a) prOVIdes In relevant part:
(a) General Rule-The value of the gross estate shall Include the value
of all property to the extent of any Interest therem of whIch the decedent
by trust or otherWISe, under whIch
has at any tlme made a transfer
he has retaIned for hIS life or for any penod not ascertamable wIthout reference to hIS death or for any penod whIch does not In fact end before hIS
death(1) the posseSSIOn or enjoyment of, or the nght to the Income from,
the property, or
(2) the nght, eIther alone or In conJunctlon wIth any person, to desIgnate the persons who shall possess or enJoy the property or the mcome therefrom.
5. All textual references to the "Internal Revenue Code" are to the INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, unless otherwIse Indicated.
6. See Llewellyn, Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Inter Vivos Transfers With A Testamentary Flavor, 13 WM. & MARy L. REv. 553 (1972).
7. INT. REv. CoDE .OF 1954, § 2037 deals WIth transfers takmg effect m possessIOn or
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in a closely held corporation is the subject of the transfer, and where
the attendant loss of voting rights would divest the settlor of control.
In Byrum, the Court dealt with a gift of stock in three unlisted corporations to an Irrevocable trust for the benefit of the grantor's children.
In the event of their death before the terminatlon of the trust, the remainder was to pass to their surviving children.s The power to pay
or withhold income was vested excluslvely in an mdependent trustee.V
However, the settlor retained the right to vote the shares of stock held
in trust.10 The retention of this power, when combined with his other
holdings, enabled him to mamtain voting control of two companies. l l
In addition, Byrum reserved the right to disapprove the sale or transfer
of the trust assets and to remove the trustee and name another corporate
trustee as successor.12 The Commissioner claimed that the retentlon of
voting rights and the power to veto the sale of stock placed the transfer
within the purview of section 2036(a) (1) and (2).13 In response, the
executrix paid an additional tax and brought a refund action.14 The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit15 and the Supreme COurt16
affirmed the district court ruling in favor of the estate.
enjoyment at death. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2038 deals WIth the settlor's retentIon
of power to alter, amend, revoke or terminate. Although the overlap of these two sections With sectIon 2036 IS consIderable, thIs Comment will be confined to an analysis
of sectIon 2036. For a discussion of the relatIonshIp of sectIon 2036 to sectIons 2037 and
2038 see W WARREN & S. SURREY, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFl' TAXATION 257-68 (1961).
8. 92 S. Ct. 2382, 2384 (1972).
9.Id.
10. Id.
11. Control of the thIrd company would have been mamtamed even if there had
been no reservatIon of VOtIng rIghts. The actual proportIons were:
Percentage
Percentage
Total
Percentage
Owned by
Owned by
Owned
Decedent
Trust
Company One
59
12
71
83
35
48
Company Two
88
42
46
Company Three
Id. at 2387 n.2.
12. 92 S. Ct. at 2385. If Byrum had retamed the power to remove the trustee and
appomt hImself the stock would have been included ill hIS estate under section 2036
(a) (2) or sectIon 2038. Sharpe, The Irrevocable Trust: Some Benefits and Risks Com-

pared WIth Revocable Trust: How to PrOVIde for the Possibility of Statutory and/or
Admzmstratzve Changes, N.Y.U. 28m lNST. ON FED. TAX. 941,955 (1970).
13. 92 S. Ct. at 2384.
14. Byrum v. Uruted States, 311 F Supp.892 (SD. OhIo 1970).
15. Uruted States v. Byrum, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.1971).
16. 92 S. Ct. 2382.
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RETAINED ENJOYMENT: SECTION 2036 (a) (I)
According to section 2036(a) (1), any gIfted property III wIuch a
grantor has retaIlled "the possesSIOn or enjoyment .. or the rIght to
income" durmg Ius life IS included III the grantor's estate for tax purposes.
In Byrum, the ComffilssIOner argued that retention of votmg control
guaranteed the grantor contmued employment as well as the rIght to
deterffilne whether and when the corporation would be liqUIdated or
merged. 17 According to the Comffilssloner, such retamed control
amounted to "enjoyment" under the statute.1S
In order to deCIde whether Byrum retamed the reqUIsite "enJoyment"
of the transferred stock so as to subject It to estate tax, it IS first necessary to determine whether the mere retention of votmg rIghts IS sufficIent to trIgger the operation of section 2036(a)(I). In 1929 the
Supreme Court in Reznecke v. Northern Trust 19 held that the retentIon
of management powers, including the power to vote stock held m trust,
could not be classmed as "enJoyment." Northern Trust was deCIded
under section 402 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1921, wIuch reqUITed transferred property to be mcluded m the gross estate of the grantor If the
lifetIme disposItion was mtended to take effect III posseSSIOn or enJoyment at Ius death. 20 In holding that the extinguIshment of management
powers at the death of the settlor did not constitute the passage of "possesSIOn" or "enJoyment" to the beneficiarIes, the Supreme Court held
that retentIon of votmg rIghts was not an "enJoyment" of the gifted
property Because section 402 (c), under wIuch Northern Trust was
deCIded, did not contam a clause comparable to section 2036(a) (2),
the dissent III Byrum strongly CrItiCIZed the maJorIty's reliance upon the
case. 21 ThIS obJection, however, IS not well founded, SInce sectIon
2036 (a) (1) parallels section 402 (c), both statutes deal WIth the grantor's
retentIOn of posseSSIOn or "enjoyment" of transferred property.22 It IS
therefore reasonable to assume that the enactment of section 2036(a) (1)
17. Id. at 2395.
18.Id.
19. 278 U.S. 339, 346 (1929).
20. Id. at 344-45.
21. 92 S. Ct. at 2399.
22. The dissentIng OpInIOn In Byrum attempted to distIngUIsh Northern Trust on the
ground that the settlor 10 that case did not have voung control. 92 S. Ct. at 2399. However, considermg the difficulty of deCIding what constItutes control In a gIven corporatIon, the maJonty was prudent 10 not vIewmg thIS factor as determInatIve. 92 S. Ct.
at 2388 n.4, 2390 n.I 0, 2391 n.13.
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sIgnified congressional acqIDescence in the judicial interpretation of
"enjoyment" under section 402 (C).23'
Thus, it seems clear that the mere existence of a power to vote stock
does not constitute "enjoyment." However, this proposition does not
foreclose the possibility of subjecting such property to estate tax, in a
case where the grantor abuses his power. It was argued in Byrum that
retention of votmg rights by the grantor not only enabled him to determme whether the corporation would liquidate or merge, but also guaranteed his continued employment as a corporate officer.24 Assuming, arguendo, that voting control did give Byrum the power to make these
decisions, the question whether such power constitutes "enJoyment'~
will turn on the manner and permissible extent to which it may be
exercISed.
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes25 held that
enjoyment as used ill the estate tax statute connotes "substantial present
economic benefit rather than technical vesting of tide or estates." 26 It
is also generally accepted that the retention of any enjoyment of the
transferred property, as opposed to all of the enjoyment, will nevertheless result in estate tax liability.27 Through a literal application of these
tax definitions of enjoyment, the Court in Byrum held that the right to
merge or liquidate was not a "present" benefit but merely a speculative
one. 28 The Court might also have noted that the exercise of a power
to merge or liquidate, even if present, would not necessarily bestow a
disproportionate economic benefit upon the grantor.
The contention that retained control of the corporation assures the
23. A statute literally or substantially re-enactmg a prIor statute after its words
have receIved a JudiCIal mterpretanon must be regarded as adopted WIth
knowledge of such construcnon and WIth the intennon that It should thereafter be Interpreted In the same way. Therefore the prIor deCISIOns, In
which the construction of the statute was settled, are bInding precedents for
its Interpretanon after the re-enactment.
H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS § 75 (1912).
24. 92 S. Ct. at 2395.
25. 326 U.S. 480 (1946).
26. The Regulations are in basic accord. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-l(b)(2) (1954) proVIdes:
The "use, possesSIOn, rIght to the income, or other enJoyment of the
transferred property" IS conSIdered as having been retained by or reserved
to the decedent to the extent that the use, possesSIOn, right to the Income, or
other enjoyment IS to be applied toward the discharge of a legal obligation
of the decedent, or otherwIse for hIs pecunzary benefit. (EmphaSIS supplied).
27. CommISSIOner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 645 (1949).
28. 92 S. Ct. at 2397.
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grantor of contmued status as a salarIed officer9 is not novel; It has
been satisfactorily decided by the Tax Court ill sImilar cases. In 1943,
for example, the court consIdered a SItuation ill whIch the decedent and
her husband transferred shares ill a family-owned busmess to theIr
children while retammg ngId control over the stock, illcluding the nght
to vote It.30 In addition, they reserved $25,000 per year as compensation
for negligible services, thus usurpmg corporate profits. The holding that
the stock was properly illcluded ill the decedent's gross estate did not
turn upon the mere retention of votmg nghts, but was mfluenced by
the unwarranted compensation which was guaranteed by the arrangement.31 Two years later, the Tax Court reached an OppOSIte result
under slightly different conditions. In Estate of Hofford 'll. CommzsStoner,32 the decedent donated corporate stock to a trust and retamed
a yearly salary. In this case, however, the compensation reserved was
reasonable in relation to the services actually performed and was held
not to constitute "enjoyment" withm the meanmg of section 2036(a) (1).
In a 1957 memorandum deCISIon the court, again emphasizing the reasonableness of the settlor's yearly salary, excluded the transferred stock
from his gross estate.33
In considenng the employment questIon in Byrum, the Supreme Court
apparently Ignored the standard established by the Tax Court. The
maJonty simply held that the right to employment was not a "substantial benefit" because of constramts of corporation law; the payment of
an unwarranted salary would have subjected the director to a denvatIve
SUIt. Although thIs conclUSIOn is not refuted by the reported facts, the
CIrcumstances of Byrum'S employment should have been carefully exammed. 34 If Byrum merely reserved reasonable compensation for hIs
services, the beneficiaries would not be deprived of any enjoyment from
the transferred stock and he would not be retaIrung taxable enjoyment
29. Id. at 2395.
30. Estate of Holland v. COmmISSIOner, 47 B.TA. 807 (1942), supplemental opmzon,
1 T.C.564 (1943).
31. The grantor m Estate of Holland carefully reserved control of the stock durmg
rus lifetlme, attachmg conditIons precedent to the absolute vestIng of tItle m the grantees.
In fact, the instrument of transfer expressly prOVIded that: "upon the death of [transshall become absolute," and that
feror]
the tItle of SaId [transferees] to SaId stock
"all of the prOVISIons of thts contract are to be and always construed to be conditions
precedent to the Tzght and tItle of [transferees] m and to the stock
"(EmphasIS
supplied). 47 B.TA. 807 (1942).
32. 4 T.C. 790 (1945).
33. Estate of William L. Belknap, P-H 1951 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 11 51,243.
34. See text followmg note 56 mfra.
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for himself by means of a wrongful appropriation. On the other hand,
if the threat of a derivative suit was illusory, and in fact the salary
stemmed from control, the Court should have found that taxable enJoyment resulted. This approach to the problem yields a result consistent
with pnor Tax Court holdings without openmg a loophole for settlors
who desire to retain enjoyment of transferred property by means of
corporate manipulation.
The Court ill Byrum thus reaffirmed the Northern Trust rationale
that management powers do not inherently constitute enjoyment. In
addition, without any inquiry into the presence of abuse, they extended
that principle to indicate that even specific benefits derived from such
powers will not be considered "enjoyment," where sufficient constraints
agamst abusive appropriation are present.
It would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that management powers
over gifted assets can be of indirect benefit to the manager. It would
be equally improper to conclude absolutely that the mere possibility
of wrongful appropriation or misuse necessitates the finding of a taxable
retention of enjoyment. The difficulties inherent in any case-by-case
treatment are of course to be considered, but the judicial effort required
in using the approach of the Tax Court is no more problematic than
the method already utilized in the policing of unreasonable compensation in income tax cases.
RIGHT TO DESIGNATE: SECTION

2036(a) (2)

Revenue Ruling 67-54 established the ComInissioner's position that
where a donor retains effective control over the issuer's dividend policy,
a gift of nonvotIng stock constitutes a proscribed transfer under 2036
(a)(2). This de facto concept of a "right to designate" was flatly rejected in Byrum when Justice Powell observed that "[t]he use of the
term 'right' implies that restraints on power are to be recognized and
that such restraints deprive the person exercising the power of a right
to do so." 35 In other words, the Court began its reasoning by defining
the term "right" within the meaning of section 2036(a) (2) as an unconstrained power or discretion.
Historically, the "right to designate" problem has arisen in caseg36
35. 92 S. Ct. at 2392 n.14.
36. Michigan Trust Co. v. Kavanaugh, 284 F.2d 502 (6th Cit. 1960); Estate of Hays
v. CommisSIoner, 181 F.2d 169 (5th Cit. 1950); Jenrungs v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cit.
1947); Delaney v. Uruted States, 264 F. Supp. 904 (WD. Ark. 1967); Estate of Patdee.
49 T.C. 140 (1967); Estate of Wier, 17 T.C. 409 (1951); Estate of Wilson, 13 T.C. 869
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where the grantor appomted hunself trustee while reservmg the power
to invade the trust corpus for the benefit of the mcome beneficiaries.37
In this context, courts have rejected the argument that reservation of any
discretionary power in the grantor is a "right to designate." Rather,
they have developed a test to determme when discretlon ceases to be a
"rIght."
The landmark case of Jenmngs v. Smtth,38 the first to articulate such
a standard, held that where the grantor's powers over trust assets are
subject to the limitatlons of determmable external standards, the retentlon of such rIghts will not VIolate the underlymg policies of sectlon
2036(a) (2).39 The application of the Jenmngs test to a mulutude of
factual situatlons has not been uruform.40 But, m spite of the disagreement over preCIsely when a trust instrument prOVIdes a sufficiently ascertamable standard, the courts agree that even a reserved power to divert
income from one beneficiary to another (which seemingly IS Withm
the express proscrIptlon of the statute) is not a "rIght" in the sense of
section 2036 if a standard IS in fact ascertainable.41 Although the facts
(1949), atf'd per curzam, 187 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1951); Estate of Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164
(1949); Estate of Frew, 8 T.C. 1240 (1947); Estate of Budlong, 7 T.C. 756 (1946), affd
m part and rev'd In part on other grounds sub nom. IndustrIal Trust Co. v. ComnussIOner,
165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947); Estate of Matson, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 309 (1944). ct.
Budd v. CommIssIoner, 49 T.C. 468 (1968), where the court began Its analySIs by staung:
Decedent was a trustee
so that the powers granted to the trustees of
that trust must be consIdered held by hIm for purposes of [§ 2036(a) (2)],
even though they were exercIsable only In hIS fidUCIary capaCIty.
The quesnon remams, however, whether the powers granted the trustees In
those two trust agreements left the decedent WIth "the rIght
to deSIgnate
the persons to possess or enJoy the property or the mcome therefrom."
37. It should be noted that m those cases the grantor had retaIned conSIderably more
direct power than that attributed to Byrum so that the reasonmg of those cases should
be clearly applicable m Byrum.
38. 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.1947).
39. Id. at 78.
40. In some of these cases the reasomng of the courts has been clear. For example In
Estate of Markson, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 309 (1944), the grantor's power to Invade
corpus for the beneficIary's "comfort and happmess" failed to prOVIde a standard whxch
an eqwty court could apply to Iinut the grantor's discretIon. The same result was
reached ill Hurd v. COmmISSIOner, 160 F.2d 610 (Ist Cir. 1947), where mvaSIon was
allowed "if CIrcumstances so reqwred." In Estate of Wier, 17 T.C. 409 (I951), the power
to Invade corpus to mamtaIn, support, and educate the beneficIary "in the manner approprIate to her stanon m life" was held to prOVIde an ascertaInable standard. Accord,
Estate of Budlong, 7 T.C. 756 (1946) ("SIckness and emergency" held to constItute an
ascertamable standard). Compare Estate of Hays v. Comnussloner, 181 F.2d 169 (5th Cir.
1950), 'WIth Estate of Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949), reachmg opposIte conclUSIOns on
the same language.
41. See, e.g., Jenmngs v. SmIth, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
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in Byrum do not involve a trustee's reserved power to invade the trust
corpus, the Jennings line of cases demonstrates by analogy that Byrum's
retained control will not constitute a right to designate if the Court is
able to find an ascertainable standard limiting the power. Indeed, the
Court found such a standard based upon the constraints of applicable
trnst principles and corporate law.
Corporate Constraints on Grantor

Jennings and the other "ascertainable standards" cases could have been
cited had the majority in Byrum examined the facts presented and recognized that a trustee-beneficIary problem was.raised. The Court concerned itself with a different type of fiduciary obligation-that of a
controlling stockholder to the mmority. Consequendy, Justice Powell
argued that even though Byrum (in his capacity of controlling stockholder) and the corporation directors were not obligated to consider
the relationship between income beneficiaries and remaindermen within
the trust, they were under a duty to the trust itself (a minority stockholder) to pay dividends when financial circumstances so warranted.
Recognizing the chilling effect of a suit by the trustee against the serdor
for wrongful action either as a director or as a shareholder, the majority
was unwilling to equate Byrum's alleged power with the "right to designate" under section 7.036.
The government a:J.d the dissent had no strong counter argument to
Powell's reasoning at this juncture.42 The heart of the argument, as in
the ascertainable standards cases, concerned the Court's application of
the test to the factual situation presented. The majority stressed the
restraining influence caused by the economic realities of small corporations. The fiduciary obligations of directors, and the duties of majority
stockholders which prevent them from placing their own interests above
those of the corporation were deemed sufficient to preclude the personal
exercise of the voting powers retained.4s The dissent asserted that although these factors presented a modicum of restraint, Byrum never42. See Justice White's dissent in Byrum where he states: "I do not deny the existence of such constramts, but their restraming effect on an otherwise tempting gross
abuse of the corporate dividend power hardly guts the great power of a controlling
director to accelerate or retard, enlarge or dimmish most diVIdends." 92 S. Ct. at 2382.
43. The argument is that m the typICal closely-held corporation, dividend policy is
dictated almost entirely by such factors as the availability of net earnings, the need
for retained earnmgs, access to capital markets, etc., all of which are "ignored at the
directors' peril.'"
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theless retamed sufficIent latltude to divert the flow of ,divIdends44
and, as a consequence, to effect the distribution of mco,me' betWeen
income beneficianes and remaindermen. ThIs was, and will contlnue
to be, the government's strongest argument. But adoptlng thIs approach
in definmg "right to desIgnate" supplies no objective means of determming when practlcal constramts on power are suffiCIent to· preclude
the finding of a "nght."
,
Constramts Imposed by Trust Prznctples
Even if the government had carned Its argument that Byrum controlled corporate diVIdend policy, that Issue loses sigruficance if Byrum'S
control over diSpOSItlOn of trust assets IS constramed. Clearly, the power
to veto all sales of trust assets was cruCIal to the government's "right
to deSIgnate" argument. Had that power not eXIsted, the unlimIted
power of disposition in the trustee would have effectlvely checked the
grantor's control over the beneficIal enjoyment of the trust. ThIS IS true
because the remvestment of trust assets could completely sever any
power retamed by the grantor.
In an analogous line of cases,45 the COmmISSIOner has conSIstently
contended that the retentlon of broad management powers by a grantor
enables hIm to deSIgnate the persons who are to receIve trust income.
Under thIs rationale, the "nght" allegedly arIses from the power to
select mvestments in growth stocks to favor the remamdermen or conversely to purchase other assets to favor the mcome benefiCIary. If Byrum's control over corporate diVIdend policy enabled hIm to transform
the trust corpus (stocks frozen m trust by means of hIs veto power) mto
high or low YIeld securItleS, the exerCIse of such discretion could determme indirectly whether the trust would pay mcome or accumulate
earnings. Yet m the management power cases,46 where this identical
44. Perhaps the dissent's best argument on thIS pomt IS that eqUIty courts are loath
to mterfere WIth the corporate director's discretIon and will accept almost any excuse
to aVOId domg so. See W CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoRPORATIONS 17 (4th ed. 1969).
ThIs pomt 15 partIcularly nnportant because the whole "ascertamable standards" concept 15 dependent upon the willingness of eqUIty courts to step m and enforce the
standards.
45. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. UnIted States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970);
UnIted States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962); Budd V CommIssIoner, 49 T.C.
468 (1968); Estate of Peters, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 994 (1964); Estate of King, 37 T.C.
973 (1962); Estate of Wurts, 1960 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. ~ 60,102; Estate of Wilson,
13 T.C. 869 (1949), aff'd per curtam, 187 F.2d 143 (3d Cir. 1951); Estate of Neal, 8 T.G.
237 (1947); Estate of Hall, 6 T.C. 933 (1946); Estate of Downe, 2 T.C. 967 (1943).
46. Cases CIted ill note 45 supra.
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power has been challenged, the lower courts have held consistendy that
section 2036 is not operative, since there are restraints inherent in the
grantor's role as a fiducIary.47 In Estate of Willard V. King,48 the Tax
Court stated:
It IS our concluslOn that LTl so far as the management of the
trust lO the lOstant case was concerned, the grantor had zn effect
made hzmself a fiduciary, and that under the law of New York
he was not at liberty to adrrunister the trust for his own benefit or
to Ignore the nghts of the beneficIaries, even though he no doubt
would be perIDltted wide latitude in the exercise of his discretion
as to the types of investments to be made.49

Apparendy the court in King answered the initial question-whether
management powers were reserved for the benefit of the trust beneficiarIes or for the benefit of the grantor-by interpreting the trust instrument and looking to the intent of the grantor.50 Since it found that
the power was reserved for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries, the
court examined applicable state laWS1 for an enumeration of duties
imposed on a grantor ill such a situation. The rule that retention of
investment powers by the grantor carries with it a fiduciary prohibition
against frustrating the purposes of the trust is either stated or assumed52
in all the management powers cases. 53 Accordingly, since Byrum's re47. State Street Trust Co. v. Uruted States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959), IS the one
apparent exception to this statement. In that case the grantor had retamed not only
normal mvestment powers, but also the rIght to invest m non-legals, the nght to classify gain as income or prmcipal, and several other powers. The court held that while
the powers nught be pemussible mdividually, when accumulated they were enough to
make the corpus taxable under section 2036 (a) (2). The case IS apparently an abberanon
and has never been followed. In 1970 It was overruled by Old Colony Trust Co. 'Il.
United States, 423 F.2d 601 (lst Cir. 1970).
48. 37 T.C. 973 (1962).
49. ld. at 980 (emphasIS supplied).
50. See also Cushman v. ComnusslOner, 153 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1946), where the
court held: "It is a quesnon of interpretanon whether or not the powers reserved as
grantor are held in a fidUCIary capaCIty or for the grantor's own purposes." Accord,
Fifth Ave. Bank v. Nunan, 59 F Supp.753 (ED.N.Y.1945).
51. Carrier v. Carner, 226 N.Y. 114, 123 N.E. 135 (1919).
52. Covey, SectIon 2036-The New Problem Child of the Federal Estate Tax, 4 TAX
COUNSELOR'S Q.121, 148 (1960).
53. But see Uruted States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962); Estate of Peters,
23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 994 (1964); Estate of Wurts, 1960 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. ~
60,102. The grantors were the trustees and It was unnecessary to attribute such dunes
to them.
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tamed right to veto all sales or acqrusitIons of trust assets is Just such a
management power, he lIDplicitly assumed the duty not to use the power
to defeat the purposes of the trust.
The question therefore is whether Byrum's fidUCIary obligations are
suffiCIent to restram hIID from usmg rus veto to enforce any shIfting of
interests WIthIn the trust which Illight result from rus "control" of corporate dividend policy. According to the Restatement of Trusts,54
investment powers of a fidUCIary must be exercIsed impartially between
income beneficiaries and remamdermen. 55 Thus, any exerCISe of Byrum's
veto power would be restramed by a court of eqUIty to the extent that
he attempted to reallocate mterests witrun the trust. In sum, smce the
government's theory requITed that Byrum have both corporate power
(over divIdends), and trust power (over transfer of assets), trus additional check on his veto power makes its posltlon untenable.
Summary Judgment

The question whether Byrum's mfluence over diVIdend policy was,
as a practical matter, suffiCIently constramed by external standards to
prevent rus abuse of discretIon, was the pnmary focus m the majority'S "nght to designate" analYSIS. In trus regard, the fact that the case
was deCIded on cross-motions for summary Judgment may be sIgmficant.
In discussmg the effect of economic factors upon the payment of dividends, Justice Powell of necesSIty was refernng to a typIcal situation
involving a small corporatIon. 56 Had the speCIfic facts been available,
it Illight have been found that the finanCIal posture of the corporations
did allow consIderable latitude m makmg diVIdend policy. The issue
then would have been narrowed to whether the respective fiduciary
obligations allowed Byrum any real discretion. In that event the case
would have been clearly analogous to the "ascertamable standards"
54.

REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

(1935).

55. ld. § 232 states:
If a trust IS created for benefiCIarIes In succeSSIOn, the trustee IS under a
duty to the successlve benefiCIarIes to act WIth due regard to theIr respectIve
mterests.
(d) Although the trustee IS not under a duty to the benefiCIary entItled to the Income to endanger the prmcIpal In order to produce a
large Income, he IS under a duty to hIm not to sacrifice Income for the
purpose of Increasmg the value of the prInCIpal. Thus, the trustee tS
under a duty to a life benefictary not to purchase or retazn unproductzve property
(EmphasIS supplied).
56. 92 S. Ct. at 2392.
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cases,57 and the unpact of the Court's holdings would have been clear.
As the case stands, the additional factor of economic constraints is sufficient to cloud the relationslnp between Byrum and the "ascertainable
standards" cases.
CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court's treatment of the "right to designate" issue under
section 2036(a) (2) will reinforce the lower court deCIsions in the "ascertainable standards" cases and the "management power" cases. In light
of the obvious dissImilarity of the powers retained by Byrum to the
disguised testamentary dispositions at which section 2036(a) (2) was
auned, the holding in tins case certamly is consistent with the Congressional mandate. There are, however, no objective means of determming
at what point the fiduciary obligatIons of company directors, coupled
with economic considerations, will be substantial enough to curtail the
donor-majorIty stockholder's discretion in "controlling" dividend polICY. To further complicate the situation, the case was decided on crossmotions for summary judgment, thus preventing the Court from considering a specific fact situation to provide an exemplar upon winch
these tests could operate. As a result, an extremely amorphous test has
arISen and no clear statement of its application has been presented.
Although the approach taken by the Court in defining the phrase
"right to desIgnate" was well reasoned as far as It went, the decision
could have had greater impact had an attempt been made to ascertain
what Congress intended to proscribe by the use of that phrase.58 It is
clear that the general purpose of section 2036 (a) and its predecessors has
been to prevent estate tax avoidance by the use of testamentary dispositions disguised m the form of an incomplete mter vivos gift. The history
of this section indicates that in its present form It is a mere patchwork
of amendments tailored to meet speCIfic situations in order to effectuate
the law's basic purpose. A prime example IS the 1931 amendment to the
Revenue Act of 1926, which was rushed through Congress in one day
to overrule three Supreme Court decisions adverse to the government.59
57. See cases CIted note 36 supra & accompanymg text.
58. See generally Murtagh, The Role of the Courts m the Interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, 24 TAX LAWYER 523 (1971).
59. The only record of legIslauve intent, statements made on the floor of the House
of Representauves, clearly mdicate that the bill was a response to McCormIck v. Burnett,
283 U.S. 784 (1931); Morsman v. Burnett, 283 U.S. 783 (1931); and Burnett v. Northern
Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931). The Comnussloner of Internal Revenue apparendy was
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It has been widely recogruzed 60 that the wording of secuon 2036
(a) (2) was msprred solely by one case, McCormzck 'V. Burnett,61 and
that It was mtended to do no more than tax trusts over wruch the grantor
retamed a speczfic and direct rIght to deSIgnate the mcome beneficIarIes.
Yet m the lower courts62 It has been ImplicItly assumed that Congress
also mtended to reach mdirect powers; otherwIse, the Issue of the exIStence of such powers would never have been reached. In Byrum, the
Supreme Court's approach to the defimuon of "rIght to deSIgnate" was
obviously based on the same unstated assumpuon.
Certamly from the pomt of VIew of the estate planner who desrres
more certainty m the estate tax laws, It would have been preferable for
the Court to have treated the questIOn by mqurrmg mto congressIOnal
mtent. Had the Court recognized that such powers as Byrum retamed
and as eXisted m the management power cases (wruch affect the relauve
interests of income beneficiarIes and remamdermen only indirectly) were
never mtended to be witrun reach of section 2036(a) (2), the question
would have been handed back to Congress. In all probability we would
have witnessed a re-run of the passage of the 1931 amendment,G3 but
the possibility eXists that Congress would have seriously reconSIdered
the underlymg policy conSIderations of trus secuon.

so disturbed over the three declSlons that he IInmediately drafted a letter to the House
Ways and Means Comnuttee requestIng that It amend sectlon 302 of the 1926 Act
to Insure that any reserved life Interests In mter VIVOS transfers would be taxable. The
bill was pushed through both houses m one day under suspenSIOn of the rules, and the
PreSIdent sIgned It mto law the evemng after the deCISIons were handed down. Consequendy, there was no comnuttee report and the bill was not pnnted. From the conversatlons on the floor of the House, however, the conclUSIOn IS mescapable that the
amendment was mtended to do no more than meet those specific deCISIOns. 74 CONGo
FlEe. 7198 (1931).
60. See, e.g., IndustrIal Trust Co. v. ComITIlSsioner, 165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947)
(dissentlng 0pImon); Gray & Covey, supra note 3; Covey, supra note 52. But see Pednck, supra note 3.
61. 283 U.S. 784 (1931).
62. See case cIted notes 36 & 45 supra.
63. See note 59 supra.

